June 5, 2008
STATE OF ALABAMA
COURT OF THE JUDICIARY
COJ #36
IN THE MATTER OF: STUART C. DUBOSE, Circuit Judge
of the First Judicial Circuit
of Alabama
ORDER
This matter is before this Court on a complaint filed by
the Judicial Inquiry Commission of the State of Alabama (tithe
JIC tI) against Stuart C. Dubose, Circuit Judge of the First
Judicial Circuit of Alabama (serving Clarke, Choctaw, and
Washington Counties). The complaint charges violations of the
Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics (tithe Canons”). The Canons
serve not only as guidelines for proper judicial conduct, they
are binding on all judges by the oath taken upon assuming
office, and violations of the Canons can serve as the basis
for disciplinary action. The charge or charges against a
judge must be proved by clear and convincing evidence before
any discipline may be imposed. Rule 10, Rules of Procedure
for the Alabama Court of the Judiciary. Article VI, § 157 of
the Alabama Constitution of 1901, provides that this Court
shall have the authority, after a public hearing, to remove
from office, to suspend without pay, to censure a judge, or to
apply such other sanction as may be prescribed by law for a
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violation of one of the Canons, misconduct in office, or
failure to perform his or her duties, or to suspend with or
without pay, or to retire a judge who is physically or
mentally unable to perform his or her duties.
On January 31, 2008, the JIC filed a complaint with this
Court against Judge Stuart C.
forth 60 charges in 8 counts,
Dubose. The complaint sets
alleging that Judge Dubose
engaged in inappropriate conduct and thereby violated several
of the Canons:
COUNT ONE
Count One alleges the following: After assuming the
bench, in relation to a lawsuit filed against him by a former
client, styled Cheryl L. Weaver, Individually and as the
Executrix of the Estate of Joseph Sulli van v. Stuart c.
Dubose, CV-2006-002709.51, Judge Dubose failed to implement a
settlement agreement, which he engineered, entered into, and
presented to the trial judge in the above-referenced civil
action; willfully, and without authorization, acted outside
the terms of the settlement agreement which he engineered,
entered into, and presented to the trial judge in the abovereferenced
civil action; willfully acted outside the terms of
the settlement agreement in the above-referenced civil action
2
to his personal benefit approximately eleven months after
entering into the referenced settlement agreement, and
immediately following a hearing during which the trial judge
indicated he would withhold ruling for a period of thirty
days; willfully attempted to influence the decision of the
trial judge in the above-referenced civil action after the
entry of the trial judge’s final judgment order by means of an
ex parte communication in which he asserted that the trial
judge’s order was illegal, unjustified, immoral, and
professionally and financially damaging; and misrepresented
the truth to the JIC as to the ex parte communication sent by
him to the trial judge in the above-referenced civil action by
testifying that opposing counsel requested that he not be
served with such communication, a claim which opposing counsel
disputed.
As a result of the above-described conduct:
Charge One of the complaint alleges that, in
relation to the above-referenced civil action, Judge
Dubose failed to uphold the integrity and
independence of the judiciary (Canon 1);
Charge Two of the complaint alleges that, in
relation to the above-referenced civil action Judge
Dubose failed to participate in establishing,
maintaining, and enforcing high standards of conduct
so that the integrity and independence of the
judiciary may be preserved (Canon 1);
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C)
Charge Three of the complaint alleges that, in
relation to the above-referenced civil action, Judge
Dubose failed to observe high standards of conduct
so that the integrity and independence of the
judiciary may be preserved (Canon 1);
Charge Four of the complaint alleges that, in
relation to the above-referenced civil action, Judge
Dubose failed to avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all his acti vi ties
(
Canon 2);
Charge Five of the complaint alleges that, in
relation to the above-referenced civil action, Judge
Dubose, by attempting to influence a judge through
ex parte communication in a proceeding in which he
was a party, failed to respect and comply with the
law (Canon 2A);
Charge Six of the complaint alleges that, in
relation to the above-referenced civil action, Judge
Dubose failed to conduct himself at all times in a
manner that promotes public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary (Canon
2A); and
Charge Seven of the complaint alleges that, in
relation to the above-referenced civil action, Judge
Dubose failed to avoid conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice that brings the judicial
office into disrepute (Canon 2B).
COUNT TWO
Count Two alleges the following: In relation to an
easement condemnation action filed against him by Alabama
Power Company, styled Alabama Power Company v. Stuart C.
Dubose, PC-07-107, Judge Dubose filed pleadings, which were
harassing and accusatory in nature; used his official position
4 as a Circuit Judge as a tactic to delay this personal legal
matter; used profanity to refer to opposing counsel; directly
disobeyed a ruling of the presiding Probate Judge with regard
to the transcription of the proceeding; threatened his
official court reporter, who transcribed the condemnation
proceeding; ordered that same court reporter to violate the
Standards of Professional Conduct of the Alabama Board of
Court Reporters by ordering that she mark her bill for
services “paid”, by demanding her tapes and notes from the
proceeding, and by commanding that she not transcribe the
proceeding or provide a copy of the transcript to opposing
counsel and to the Probate Court, despite Judge Dubose’s
agreement to the contrary; and made various misrepresentations
of fact regarding his behavior in this regard to the JIC, as
more particularly set out in paragraph 48 of the complaint.
As a result of the above-described conduct:
Charge Eight of the complaint alleges that, in
relation to the above-referenced condemnation
proceeding, Judge Dubose failed to uphold the
integrity and independence of the judiciary (Canon
1) ;
Charge Nine of the complaint alleges that, in
relation to the above-referenced condemnation
proceeding, Judge Dubose failed to participate in
establishing, maintaining and enforcing high
standards of conduct so that the integrity and
independence of the judiciary may be preserved
5(Canon 1);
Charge Ten of the complaint alleges that, in
relation to the above-referenced condemnation
proceeding, Judge Dubose failed to avoid impropriety
and the appearance of impropriety in all his
activities (Canon 2);
Charge Eleven of the complaint alleges that, in
relation to the above-referenced condemnation
proceeding and, more specifically, with regard to
his direction that the court reporter not transcribe
or distribute a transcript of the proceeding, Judge
Dubose failed to respect and comply with the law
(Canon 2A);
Charge Twelve of the complaint alleges that, in
relation to the above-referenced condemnation
proceeding, Judge Dubose failed to conduct himself
at all times in a manner that promotes public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary (Canon 2A);
Charge Thirteen of the complaint alleges that,
in relation to the above-referenced condemnation
proceeding, Judge Dubose failed to maintain the
decorum and temperance befitting his office (Canon
2B) ;
Charge Fourteen of the complaint alleges that,
in relation to the above-referenced condemnation
proceeding and, more specifically, in regard to the
misrepresentations of fact made by him to the JIC
regarding that same event, Judge Dubose failed to
uphold the integrity of the judiciary (Canon 1);
Charge Fifteen of the complaint alleges that, in
relation to the above-referenced condemnation
proceeding and, more specifically, in regard to the
misrepresentations of fact made by him to the JIC
regarding that same event, Judge Dubose failed to
observe high standards of conduct so that the
integrity and independence of the judiciary may be
preserved (Canon 1);
6 Charge Sixteen of the complaint alleges that, in
relation to the above-referenced condemnation
proceeding and, more specifically, in regard to his
attempts to use his official position as a delaying
tactic in this personal legal matter, Judge Dubose
failed to observe high standards of conduct so that
the integrity and independence of the judiciary may
be preserved (Canon 1);
Charge Seventeen of the complaint alleges that, ‘
in relation to the above-referenced condemnation
proceeding and, more specifically, in regard to his
attempts to use his official position as a delaying
tactic in this personal legal matter, Judge Dubose
failed to avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all his activities (Canon 2);
Charge Eighteen of the complaint alleges that,
in relation to the above-referenced condemnation
proceeding and, more specifically, in regard to his
attempts to use his official position as a delaying
tactic in this personal legal matter, Judge Dubose
failed to conduct himself at all times in a manner
that promotes public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary (Canon 2A);
Charge Nineteen of the complaint alleges that,
in relation to the above-referenced condemnation
proceeding and, more specifically, in regard to his
attempts to use his official position as a delaying
tactic in this personal legal matter, Judge Dubose
failed to avoid conduct prej udicial to the
administration of justice that brings the judicial
office into disrepute (Canon 2B); and
Charge Twenty of the complaint alleges that, in
relation to the. above-referenced condemnation
proceeding and, more specifically, in regard to his
attempts to use his official position as a delaying
tactic in this personal legal matter, Judge Dubose
used the prestige of his office to advance his own
private interests (Canon 2C).
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COUNT THREE
Count Three alleges the following: In relation to a
di vorce proceeding in which he presided, styled W. A. J. v.
R.L.J., DR-2006-103, Judge Dubose, pursuant to an ex parte
conversation with counsel for the husband/father, entered an
order permitting the husband/father overnight visitation with
the parties’ minor child without providing notice of any
visitation hearing to opposing counsel; subsequently rescinded
the visitation order as the result of outside pressure and
cri ticism in light of an ongoing investigation by the
Department of Human Resources (“DHR”) of the husband/father in
relation to allegations of sexual misconduct with a child;
conducted a subsequent hearing during which he blamed both DHR
and the wife/mother’s counsel for not bringing the
investigation to his attention prior to his entering the
visitation order, directed the DHR representative to amend the
inveitigative report to reflect that, prior to entry of the
order, Judge Dubose was unaware of the allegations, and
ordered his official court reporter not to transcribe remarks
by the wife/mother’s counsel; issued an order subsequent to
the fact-finding hearing in which he ordered DHR to seal its
records of the investigation and to notify Judge Dubose
personally of any allegations of abuse in any matter pending
in his court; issued an order sealing the transcript of the
fact-finding hearing; demanded the court reporter’s tapes and
notes from the proceeding and commanded that she delete the
transcript from her computer in violation of the Standards of
Professional Conduct of the Alabama Board of Court Reporters;
and misrepresented the truth to the JIC as to the above
events, by testifying falsely regarding the circumstances
pursuant to which the visitation order was initially issued.
Charge Twenty-One of the complaint alleges that,
in relation to the above-referenced divorce
proceeding, Judge Dubose failed to uphold the
integrity and independence of the judiciary (Canon
1) ;
Charge Twenty-Two of the complaint alleges that,
in relation to the above-referenced divorce
proceeding and, more specifically, in regard to the
misrepresentations of fact made by him to the JIC,
Judge Dubose failed to observe high standards of
conduct so that the integrity and independence of
the judiciary may be preserved (Canon 1);
Charge Twenty-Three of the complaint alleges
that, in relation to the above-referenced divorce
proceeding and, more specifically, in regard to his
instructions to the official court reporter, Judge
Dubose failed to respect and comply with the law
(Canon 2A); and
Charge Twenty-Four of the complaint alleges
that, in relation to the above-referenced divorce
proceeding, Judge Dubose initiated and considered ex
parte communications (Canon 3A(4)).
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COUNT FOUR
Count Four alleges the following: On October 22, 2007,
during a recess in his courtroom proceedings, Judge Dubose
engaged in a conversation with John White, Esq., a Mobile
lawyer, regarding an accident and alleged injury resulting
from Judge Dubose’s use of a La-Z-Boy recliner, which
culminated in a civil lawsuit against the manufacturer, filed
in Mobile County and styled Stuart C. Dubose and Allison
Dubose v. La-Z-Boy, Inc., CV-05-1007. During his conversation
with Mr. White, Judge Dubose was overheard uttering profanity
and both threatening and disparaging remarks against specific
members of the bar and the judiciary in Mobile County,
particularly the trial judge and opposing counsel in the
action styled Cheryl L. Weaver, Individually and as the
Executrix of the Estate of Joseph Sullivan v. Stuart C.
Dubose, CV-2006-002709.51, and discussed in Count One, above.
Judge Dubose further instructed Mr. White to relay a
threatening message to those judges and stated his intention
to use his official position to further a plan of revenge
against attorneys from the Mobile area for perceived slights.
Judge Dubose subsequently inquired of his official court
reporter whether she had overheard his conversation with Mr.
10
White, instructed her to lie if questioned whether he had made
disparaging remarks about Mobile attorneys and judges, then
later misrepresented the truth to the JIC as to the utterance
of the above-referenced remarks.
Charge Twenty-Five of the complaint alleges
that, in relation to the above-referenced incident,
Judge Dubose failed to uphold the integrity of the
judiciary (Canon 1);
Charge Twenty-Six of the complaint alleges that,
in relation to the above-referenced incident, Judge
Dubose ‘failed to participate in establishing,
maintaining, and enforcing high standards of conduct
so that the integrity and independence of the
judiciary may be preserved (Canon 1);
Charge Twenty-Seven of the complaint alleges
that, in relation to the above-referenced incident,
Judge Dubose failed to observe high standards of
conduct so that the integrity and independence of
the judiciary may be preserved (Canon 1);
Charge Twenty-Eight of the complaint alleges
that, in relation to the above-referenced incident,
Judge Dubose failed to avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all his activities
(Canon 2);
Charge Twenty-Nine of the complaint alleges
that, in relation to the above-referenced incident,
Judge Dubose failed to conduct himself at all times
in a manner that promotes public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary (Canon
2A); and
Charge Thirty of the complaint alleges that, in
relation to the above-referenced incident, Judge
Dubose failed to avoid conduct prej udicial to the
administration of justice that brings the judicial
office into disrepute (Canon 2B).
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COUNT FIVE
Count Five alleges the following: In relation to four
probation revocation hearings held in Judge Dubose’s courtroom
on June 19, 2007, and more particularly described in paragraph
96 of the complaint, Judge Dubose held each hearing without
the presence of either respective counsel for each
probationer or a representative of the District Attorney’s
office being present, and, in one case, held the hearing
without the presence of the affected probationer. In each of
the four cases Judge Dubose entered an order revoking
probation, which, excepting the one case where even the
probationer was not present, indicated that the probationer
was present and represented by counsel, but that counsel was
not present. The orders further reflected that the State of
Alabama was represented by Ms. Paula Green, a probation-office
secretary.
Charge Thirty-One of the complaint alleges that,
in relation to the above-referenced probation
revocations, Judge Dubose failed to uphold the
integrity and independence of the judiciary (Canon
1) ;
Charge Thirty-Two of the complaint alleges that,
in relation to the above-referenced probation
revocations, Judge Dubose failed to participate in
establishing, maintaining, and enforcing high
standards of conduct so that the integrity and
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independence of the judiciary may be preserved
(Canon 1);
Charge Thirty-Three of the complaint alleges
that, in relation to the above-referenced probation
revocations, Judge Dubose failed to observe high
standards of conduct so that the integrity and
independence of the judiciary may be preserved
(Canon 1);
Charge Thirty-Four of the complaint alleges
that, in relation to the above-referenced probation
revocations, Judge Dubose failed to avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all
his activities (Canon 2);
Charge Thirty-Five of the complaint alleges
that, in relation to the above-referenced probation
revocations, Judge Dubose failed to respect and
comply with the law (Canon 2A);
Charge Thirty-Six of the complaint alleges that,
in relation to the above-referenced probation
revocations, Judge Dubose failed to avoid conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice that
brinqs the judicial office into disrepute (Canon
2B); and
Charge Thirty-Seven of the complaint alleges
that, in relation to the above-referenced probation
revocations, Judge Dubose failed to accord to every
person who is legally interested in a proceeding, or
his lawyer, full right to be heard and to neither
initiate nor consider ex parte communications (Canon
3A (4) ) .
COUNT SIX
Count Six alleges the following: In relation to a summary
judgment hearing in a civil action, styled Troy Langford, as
Administrator of the Estate of Joan Williams v. Aubrey
13
(
Williams, CV-2005-30, Judge Dubose was acquainted and had a
conversation with Mr. Langford, the plaintiff, during a recess
prior to the hearing, then later misrepresented the truth to
the JIC regarding his understanding of the purpose for Mr.
Langford’s presence in the courtroom. Judge Dubose also
instructed the official court reporter to change certain
terminology in her notes from the hearing and instructed her
not to relay that change to the JIC and also not to tell the
JIC that he instructed her not to report it.
In addition, both before and after the hearing in the
above-referenced action, Judge Dubose excused the official
court reporter from the courtroom, removed his judicial robe,
and made threatening, profane, and intimidating remarks to the
parties, to their respective counsel, and to Washington County
Sheriff Richard Stringer, which warned them against providing
information to the JIC. Judge Dubose also made disparaging
remarks directly referring to the JIC, then later
misrepresented the truth to the JIC about the specific remarks
made by him during the above-referenced incident.
Charge Thirty-Eight of the complaint alleges
that, in relation .to the above-referenced incident,
Judge Dubose failed to uphold the integrity and
independence of the judiciary (Canon 1);
Charge Thirty-Nine of the complaint alleges
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that, in relation to the above-referenced incident,
Judge Dubose failed to participate in establishing,
maintaining, and enforcing high standards of conduct
so that the integrity and independence of the
judiciary may be preserved (Canon 1);
Charge Forty of the complaint alleges that, in
relation to the above-referenced incident, Judge
Dubose failed to observe high standards of conduct
so that the integrity and independence of the
judiciary may be preserved (Canon 1);
Charge Forty-One of the complaint alleges that,
in relation to the above-referenced incident, Judge
Dubose failed to avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all his acti vi ties
(Canon 2);
Charge Forty-Two of the complaint alleges that,
in relation to the above-referenced incident, Judge
Dubose failed to conduct himself at all times in a
manner · that promotes public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary (Canon
2A) ;
Charge Forty-Three of the complaint alleges
that, in relation to the above-referenced incident,
Judge Dubose failed to avoid conduct prejudicial to
the administration of justice that brings the
judicial office into disrepute (Canon 2B); and
Charge Forty-Four of the complaint alleges that,
in relation to the above-referenced incident, Judge
Dubose failed to be patient, dignified, and
courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers,
and others with whom he deals in his official
capacity (Canon 3A(3)).
COUNT SEVEN
Count Seven alleges the following: In relation to a
social event welcoming him to the bench following the primary
15
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~ ..
o
election in which he ran unopposed, Judge Dubose informed the
attorneys in attendance that he was their “friend” and that
they would have a “home field advantage” over lawyers from
other judicial circuits, especially in cases involving defense
attorneys and in cases involving lawyers from Mobile or
Birmingham. In addition, he encouraged pre-judgment ex parte
communication in all non-jury cases. Judge Dubose also made
disparaging remarks regarding the trial judge in the action
styled Cheryl L. Weaver, Individually and as the Executrix of
the Estate of Joseph Sullivan v. Stuart C. Dubose, CV-2006-
002709.51, then later misrepresented the truth to the JIC by
denying that he made those specific remarks.
Charge Forty-Five of the complaint alleges that,
while a candidate for judicial office and in
relation to the above-described events, Judge Dubose
failed to refrain from political activity
inappropriate to judicial office (Canon 7);
Charge Forty-Six of the complaint alleges that,
while a candidate for judicial office and in
relation to the above-described events, Judge Dubose
made promises of conduct in office other than the
faithful and impartial performance of the duties of
the office (Canon 7B(1) (c));
Charge Forty-Seven of the complaint alleges
that, while a candidate for judicial office, Judge
Dubose failed to endeavor at all times to refrain
from political activities inappropriate to the
judicial office that he holds or seeks (Canon 7A(1))
and, more specifically, that he failed to observe
high standards of conduct so that the integrity ~nd
16
independence of the judiciary may be preserved
(Canon 1); failed to avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all his acti vi ties
(Canon 2); failed to conduct himself at all times in
a manner that promotes public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary (Canon
2A); conveyed to others that they are in a special
position to influence him (Canon 2C); and made
promises of conduct in office other than the
faithful and impartial performance of the duties of
the office (Canon 7B(1) (c));
Charge Forty-Eight of the complaint alleges
that, while serving in his official capacity and in
relation to the above-described events, Judge Dubose
failed to uphold the integrity and independence of
the judiciary (Canon 1);
Charge Forty-Nine of the complaint alleges that,
while serving in his official capacity and in
relation to the above-described events, Judge Dubose
failed to participate in establishing, maintaining,
and enforcing high standards of conduct so that the
integrity and independence of the judiciary may be
preserved (Canon 1);
Charge Fifty of the complaint alleges that,
while serving in his official capacity and in
relation to the above-described events, Judge Dubose
failed to observe high standards of conduct so that
the integrity and independence of the judiciary may
be preserved (Canon 1);
Charge Fifty-One of the complaint alleges that,
while serving in his official capacity and in
relation to the above-described events, Judge Dubose
failed to avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all his activities (Canon 2);
Charge Fifty-Two of the complaint alleges that,
while serving in his official capacity and in
relation to the above-described events, Judge Dubose
failed to conduct himself at all times in a manner
that promotes public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary (Canon 2A); and
Charge Fifty-Three of the complaint alleges
that, while serving in his official capacity and in
relation to the above-described events, Judge Dubose
failed to avoid conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice that brings the judicial
office into disrepute (Canon 2B).
COUNT EIGHT
Count Eight alleges the following: After the primary
election in which he ran unopposed, but prior to the general
election, Judge Dubose instructed his secretary to contact all
known attorneys, who had openly supported Judge Dubose’s
opponent, and to invite them to schedule an appointment with
Judge Dubose. Thereafter, Judge Dubose met individually with
at least five members of the First Circuit bar, requested that
they read his candidacy-announcement letter, questioned their
lack of support in the election, and attempted to coerce
pledges of future support for his planned reelection attempt
in six years. Judge Dubose also blamed at least one of those
attorneys for blocking a prior appointment effort by then
Governor Siegelman. Judge Dubose later repeatedly
misrepresented the truth to the JIC about his conduct,
comments and requests during the meetings, and by also falsely
denying that he was responsible for scheduling the meetings.
Charge Fifty-Four of the complaint alleges that,
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while a candidate for judicial office and in
relation to the above-described events, Judge Dubose
failed to endeavor at all times to refrain from
political activities inappropriate to the judicial
office that he holds or seeks (Canon 7) and, more
specifically, that he failed to uphold the integrity
and independence of the judiciary (Canon 1); failed
to uphold high standards of conduct so that the
integrity and independence of the judiciary may be
preserved (Canon 1); failed to avoid impropriety and
the appearance of impropriety in all his activities
(Canon 2); and failed to conduct himself at all
times in a manner that promotes public confidence in
the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary
(Canon 2A);
Charge Fifty-Five of the complaint alleges that,
while serving in his official capacity and in
relation to the above-described events, Judge Dubose
failed to uphold the integrity and independence of
the judiciary (Canon 1);
Charge Fifty-Six of the complaint alleges that,
while serving in his official capacity and in
relation to the above-described events, Judge Dubose
failed to participate in establishing, maintaining,
and enforcing high standards of conduct so that the
integrity and independence of the judiciary may be
preserved (Canon 1);
Charge Fifty-Seven of the complaint alleges
that, while serving in his official capacity and in
relation to the above-described events, Judge Dubose
failed to observe high standards of conduct so that
the integrity and independence of the judiciary may
be preserved (Canon 1);
Charge Fifty-Eight of the complaint alleges
that, while serving in his official capacity and in
relation to the above-described events, Judge Dubose
failed to avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all his activities (Canon 2);
Charge Fifty-Nine of the complaint alleges that,
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while serving in his official capacity and in
relation to the above-described events, Judge Dubose
failed to conduct himself at all times in a manner
that promotes public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary (Canon 2A); and
Charge Sixty of the complaint alleges that,
while serving in his official capacity and in
relation to the above-described events, Judge Dubose
failed to avoid conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice that brings the judicial
office into disrepute (Canon 2B).
Judge Dubose answered the complaint filed by the JIC,
denying all charges, and asserting that, at the time of the
alleged inappropriate conduct, as set out above, and during
the JIC inquiry, he was suffering from diminished mental
capacity. The case was scheduled for trial before this Court
on June 4, 2008.
At a pretrial conference held immediately before the
trial began, Judge Dubose’s counsel raised the issue of Judge
Dubose’s competency to stand trial on the above-referenced
charges and requested that the case be continued until the
completion of a psychiatric evaluation ordered in connection
wi th a criminal case styled Uni ted Sta tes of America v.
Stewart Craig Dubose, currently pending in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Alabama, Southern
Division, Criminal Action No. MJ-08-0090-M. After conducting
a pretrial hearing on the issue of Judge Dubose’s competency
20
to stand trial, and after carefully considering the evidence
presented by Judge Dubose and the JIC regarding Judge Dubose’s
competency, the Court of the Judiciary unanimously found that
Judge Dubose was capable of understanding the nature of the
charges against him and was capable of assisting counsel with
a reasonable degree of rational understanding of the facts and
legal proceedings against him and that, therefore, Judge
Dubose was competent to stand trial in this matter.
We note that Judge Dubose failed to appear for the trial
on June 4, 2008, and that counsel for Judge Dubose stipulated
in open court that Judge Dubose, who, at the time of the
trial, was incarcerated in connection with the abovereferenced
federal criminal case, had been properly notified
of the trial date, that transportation was made available to
Judge Dubose to bring him to the trial, and that Judge Dubose
could have appeared at the trial had he chosen to do so.
Based on this stipulation, the Court of the Judiciary
unanimously found that Judge Dubose voluntarily failed to
appear for the trial and that the Court was authorized to
proceed with the trial in his absence pursuant to Rule 11,
Rules of Procedure for the Alabama Court of the Judiciary,
which provides that “[n] otwi thstanding the failure of any
21
judge … to appear, the Court may proceed with the hearing,
provided however that all evidence in support of the complaint
shall be heard by the Court in public hearing or filed in the
course of public hearing.”
The Court of the Judiciary, having heard the evidence in
this matter, and after due consideration, hereby denies Judge
Dubose’s motion for a judgment as a matter of law made in open
court at the conclusion of the JIC’s case and renewed after
the evidence was closed and finds by clear and convincing
evidence that Judge Stuart C. Dubose is guilty of violating
Canons 1,2, 2A, 2B, 2C, 3A(3), 3A(4), 7, 7A(l), and 7B(1) (c).
The Court does not find diminished capacity to be an
affirmative defense or to otherwise mitigate the disciplinary
action requested by the JIC — removal of Judge Dubose from
office. The Court notes its agreement with the following
statement by the Supreme Court of Michigan in In re Hon. James
McCauley Seitz, Monroe County Probate Court, etc., 441 Mich.
590, 624-25, 495 N.W. 2d 559, 575 (Mich. 1993):
“[T]he physical and emotional difficulties that
petitioner experienced during a portion of the
period in question, while they certainly merit
sympathy and may serve in mitigation of the
sanction, cannot be accepted as justification per
se …. His conduct as a judge must be evaluated on
the basis of objective criteria applicable to all
judges similarly situated within the system.
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[Mardikian v. Comm. on Judicial Performance, 40
Cal.3d 473, 485, 709 P.2d 852 (1985).]
“We first note that the purpose of judicial
discipline is not to punish, but to maintain the
integrity of the judicial process.
“The purpose of these proceedings is not to
impose punishment on the respondent judge, or to
exact any civil recovery, but to protect the people
from corruption and abuse on the part of those who
wield judicial power. [In re Leon Jenkins, 437
Mich. 15, 28, 465 N.W.2d 317 (1991) (citing In re
Mikesell, 396 Mich. 517, 528-529; 243 N.W.2d 86
[1976]).]
“In view of the fact that punishment is not a
purpose of judicial discipline, this does not leave
much room for mitigation. 44 Nevertheless, we would
not preclude the possibility that personal
mitigating circumstances could be considered in
determining the discipline to be imposed when, and
only when, it does not compromise the first and
foremost goal of protecting the judicial process.
Any conflict between exercising such a deference to
a personal problem of the officeholder and the
demands of the judicial office would need to be
reconciled in favor of the integrity of the office.
A judgeship is a privilege, not a right.
n[W]hen one commits judicial misconduct he not
only marks himself as a potential subject of
judicial discipline, he denigrates an institution.
Accordingly, a decision on judicial discipline must
be responsive to a significant institutional
consideration, ‘the preservation of the integrity of
the judicial system.’ Institutional integrity,
after all, is the core of institutional
effectiveness. [In re Probert, 411 Mich. 210, 225,
308 N.W.2d 773 (1981).J
23
“44See Kennick v. COmIn on Judicial Performance,
50 Cal.3d 297, 342, 267 Cal.Rptr. 293, 787 P.2d 591
(1990) (‘Protection of the public and of the
integrity of the judiciary precludes allowing
petitioner’s reported physical or emotional
difficul ties to bar a determination of “conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice”‘).”
See also In the matter of Robert A. Cothren, Court of the
Judiciary No. 28.The Court also agrees with the views expressed by the
Supreme Court of Louisiana in In re Judge Monty L. Doggett,
874 So. 2d 805, 815-16 (La. 2004):
” [R] emoval of a duly elected member of the
judiciary is a serious undertaking which should only
be borne with the utmost care so as not to unduly
disrupt the public I s choice for service in the
judiciary. However, this state’s constitution vests
this court with the duty to preserve the integrity
of the bench for the benefit of that same public by
ensuring that all who don the black robe and serve
as ministers of justice do not engage in public
conduct which brings the judicial office into
disrepute.
The office of judge is one in which the general
public has a deep and vital interest, and, because
that is true, the official conduct of judges, as
well as their private conduct, is closely observed.
When a judge, either in his official capacity or as
a private citizen, is guilty of such conduct as to
cause others to question his character and morals,
the people not only lose respect for him as a man
but lose respect for the court over which he
presides as well. This court has clearly
articulated that one who holds a judicial office
must adhere to the highest standards of personal
24
, ,’.
1
‘-. ‘
conduct.”
Finally, the Court finds persuasive the following
conclusions reached by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in
Inquiry into the Conduct of the Hon. Harvey C. Ginsberg, 690
N.W. 2d 539, 549-50 (Minn. 2004):
“‘A judge has a position of power and
prestige in a democratic society espousing
justice for all persons under law. The
role of the judge in the administration of
justice requires adherence to the highest
standard of personal and official conduct.
Of those to whom much is committed, much is
demanded. A judge, therefore, has the
responsibility of conforming to a higher
standard of conduct than is expected of
lawyers or other persons in society.
Willful violations of law or other
misconduct by a judge, whether or not
directly related to judicial duties, brings
the judicial office into disrepute and
thereby prejudices the administration of
justice. A judge’s conduct in his or her
personal life adversely affects the
administration of justice when it
diminishes public respect for the
judiciary. Our legal system can function
only so long as the public, having
confidence in the integrity of its judges,
accepts and abides by judicial decisions.
The essential attributes of a judge are not
only intellectual competence but adherence
to ethical standards of conduct.’
“[Complaint Concerning Winton,] 350 N.W.2d [337,]
340 [(Minn. 1984)].”
Based on the overwhelming and largely undisputed evidence
of gross misconduct on the part of Judge Dubose that was
25
o ()
presented at the trial, the Court can find no reasonable basis
to mitigate the disciplinary action requested by the JIC. As
the Supreme Court of Minnesota noted in Inquiry into the
Conduct of the Hon. Harvey C. Ginsberg, supra, at 550, the
Court is persuaded “that any sanction short of removal would
be wholly inadequate in the face of this aggregation of
serious misconduct. “, The Court finds this to be especially
true in light of the testimony of Dr. Doug McKeown and the
following specific conclusion that Dr. McKeown reached in his
psychological evaluation of Judge Dubose:
“SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
Judge Stuart C. Dubose is a 51-year-old currently
suspended Circuit Court Judge from the First
Judicial Circuit in Alabama. Current assessment
would reflect an individual with a significant
substance abuse history primarily associated with
prescription drugs over the past five years that
have contributed to psychotic, inappropriate, and
aberrant thinking and behavior. This examiner would
consider the substance abuse difficulties and the
associated psychotic and depressive symptoms
treatable. Judge Dubose continues to demonstrate to
this examiner a need for intensive psychiatric
treatment and follow up. Of greater concern appears
to be the significant maladaptive and overpowering
personality disorder of long-standing. Judge Dubose
demonstrates significant narcissistic personality
disorder traits and behavior which are not likely to
respond to treatment and intervention and would be
considered to be a significant impediment in his
ability to maintain objectivity, judgment, and
appropriate decision making skills. Unfortunately,
the self-centered, self serving, and self justifying
characteristics would not be likely to be amenable
26
to treatment or change over time.”
(Emphasis added.) The Court, mindful that Judge Dubose faces
serious mental-health challenges, and recognizing that
personal mitigating circumstances may and should be considered
in determining the scope of the discipline to be imposed,
nonetheless adheres to the proposition that such a
circumstance· should be considered in mitigation when, and only
when, it does not compromise the primary goal of protecting
the integrity of the office and the judicial process.
Based on the legal authorities and the findings noted
above, and after considering all possible sanctions to
determine an appropriate disposition in this case, it is
ORDERED that Judge Stuart C. Dubose is hereby removed as
Circuit Judge of the First Judicial Circuit of Alabama. Costs
of this proceeding are taxed against Judge Dubose.
All of the Judges of the Court of the Judiciary concur.
Done this 5th day of
27
William D. Melton, Judge
me L. North, Judge